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Fear of an Islamic Planet?




1. Introduction: “Radical Islamic Terrorism” between
the Media
1 In mid-July 2016, just three and a half months short of the U.S. presidential election,
CNN aired a report on the psychology of politically motivated terror. “Fear,” the report
cited a well-known psychiatrist, “is the primary psychological weapon underlying acts
of terrorism” (LaMotte). When persistently exposed to a perceived or real threat, the
human  mind  becomes  smitten  by  fear,  focused  on  the  subjective  menace  to  our
physical integrity. “Your body on constant fear,” the report concluded, “is not a pretty
sight” (LaMotte). The immediate background of the CNN story was another terrorist
attack that had taken place just one day earlier, this time in the French city of Nice—
where a nineteen-ton cargo truck deliberately plowed through crowds of people, killing
86 and injuring 458. The Nice incident was widely perceived as one in a long series of
attacks  that  illustrated  the  threat  of  what  came  to  be  known  as  “radical  Islamic
terrorism”  (Trump,  “Radical  Islamic  Terrorism”).  In  this  political  rhetoric,  fueled
during the 2016 elections, the fear of political extremism became conjoined with a fear of
Islam (the religion being blamed in the mainstream media as the driving force behind
global terrorism). During this decisive period of global backlash to progressive agendas,
the future  U.S.  president  Donald  Trump  used  the  catchphrase  “radical  Islamic
terrorism” repeatedly in political  speeches,  statements,  and tweets,  thus stoking an
already prevalent discourse of religiously motivated fear; Trump employed the phrase
effectively in a statement after the shooting at the Orlando nightclub “Pulse” in June
2016, but also in his inaugural address on January 20, 2017 as well as at many other
occasions (Beauchamp).1
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2 The award-winning journalist and scholar Lawrence Pintak has argued that the slogan
“Islam hates us” played a crucial role in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign (1). “Those
three words helped propel Donald Trump to the White House.  They provoked jeers
from his supporters, fear within the American Muslim body politic and anger across the
Muslim world” (Pintak 1).2 Trump’s attacks were part and parcel of an orchestrated set
of  rhetorical  invectives  against  American  Muslims,  often  disguised  as  attempts  at
national self-defense. Ted Cruz’s proclamation, “Radical Islam is on the rise,” in August
of 2015 fits into this pattern of fearmongering as well as Ben Carson’s statement that
“Global jihadists” were “an existential threat to our nation” (qtd. in Pintak 12). While
this  type  of  Islamophobic  rhetoric  in  the  United  States  can  be  traced  back  to  the
country’s historical beginnings – in particular, the Algerine hostage crisis in the 1790s
and  the  ensuing  anti-Islamic  sentiment  that  gripped  the  imagination  of  the  early
republic (see Brandt; Pintak 3-7)3—it gained momentum after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of 9/11, Islamophobia became one of the motors
of public discourse in the U.S., initiating not only debates on the role of ‘the Other,’ but
also  contributing to  a  culture  of  self-fashioning in  which the  American nation was
positioned in opposition to Islam. Defined as “a complex, much-contested and highly
emotive  issue”  (Allen,  “Islamophobia”  376),  the  fear  of  Islam  was  instrumental  in
tailoring a specter that seemed suitable for usage in a series of different media, from
cinema and television to newspapers, books, and internet blogs. Catering to a powerful
set  of  apprehensions  and  worries,  the  discourse  of  Islamophobia  has  since  grown
dramatically  in proportions,  transforming into what  can be called fear  of  an  Islamic
planet (to adapt Michael Warner’s famous phrase Fear of a Queer Planet from his 1993
anthology).
3 In this essay, I would like to examine the striking power of Islamophobic imagery that
reaches across various media, including television, cinema, literature, and the Internet.
I  will  argue  that  through  the  dynamic  cross-references  between  these  media  the
rhetoric  of  Islamophobia  can  become  particularly  forceful  and  unsettling.  For  this
process,  I  shall  use  the  term  intermedial  exchange to  indicate  the  degree  of
interdependency  between  medial  discourses.4 Images  distributed  on  television  may
refer back to existing cinematic snapshots and, at the same time, inspire perceptions
and representations in literature and on the Internet.  According to Irina Rajewsky,
intermedial phenomena “take place between media. ‘Intermedial’ therefore designates
those configurations which have to do with a crossing of borders between media” (46).5
I have chosen three novels from the post-9/11 era—Khaled Hosseini’s The Kite Runner
(2003), John Updike’s Terrorist (2006), and Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist
(2007)—to pinpoint the mechanisms of intermedial exchange that are at work here. All
three works employ sophisticated strategies of border crossing that connect various
media  to  establish  a  conversation  on  modern-day  Islam  and  its  cultural
representations.
4 In  particular,  I  would  like  to  discuss  how  the  intermedial  connection  between  the
discourses  of  “Islamophobia”  and  “terrorism”  operates.  The  term “terrorism”  was
coined as early as the late eighteenth century, connoting the “unlawful use of violence
and intimidation,  especially  against  civilians,  in  the  pursuit  of  political  aims”
(“Terrorism”).  Likewise,  the concept of  “Islamophobia” is  grounded in the realm of
fear. First used in 1923, “Islamophobia” indicates a strong fear of the Islamic religion or
of  Muslims,  often  regarding  either  of  them  as  the  geopolitical  source  of  terrorist
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attacks. As sociological studies have shown, the existence of Islamophobia in a given
country does not stand in correlation with the presence of Muslims in that territory,
but  is  nourished through a  complex  interplay  of  various  media  in  cultural  life  (cf.
Sayyid and Vakil 319). Far from being rational or logical, Islamophobia is marked by
emotions, figuring as “an affective part of social stigma towards Islam and Muslims,
namely fear” (Kunst, Sam, and Ulleberg 226).6
5 In  other  words,  Islamophobia  must  be  seen  as  a  cultural  phenomenon,  crafted,
disseminated, and circulated through medial practices such as television reports, films,
literary texts, and the Internet. The specter of Islam is systematically constructed, as
Edward  Said  has  convincingly  shown  in  his  study  on  the  religion’s  medial
representation in the Western hemisphere, through a “sheer variety of newspapers,
magazines,  and  radio  and  television  programs…  to  say  nothing  of  books  and
pamphlets” (Covering Islam 49). Thus conceived, Islamophobia is a systemic component
of what Lawrence Pintak calls a “feeding frenzy”—a kind of cultural slugfest that “the
media—particularly cable TV” contribute to (13). While media coverage often feeds into
—and augments—cultural anxieties, it also engages in the aesthetic illusion that there
was any measurable information value regarding the realities of Islam. “The curious thing
about  these  [Islamophobic]  statements,”  Said  observes,  “is  that  they  are  assertions
made about Islam, not on the basis of evidence internal to Islam, but rather on the basis
of  a  logic  deliberately  outside  Islam”  (Orientalism 280).  Accordingly,  most  acts  of
“covering Islam” in the media constitute “a one-sided activity that obscures what ‘we’
do,  and  highlights  instead  what  Muslims  and  Arabs  by  their  very  flawed  nature
are” (Said, Covering Islam xxii).
6 The rhetoric of “‘us’ vs. ‘them’” lies at the heart of a number of popular TV shows such
as  Homeland (which  I  will  discuss  later  in  this  essay),  thus  contributing  to  a
representation of Islam that seems entrenched in a highly dualistic ideological frame of
mind. “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” one critic summarizes
Homeland’s implicit message (Zaheer). While purporting to talk about the social reality
in crisis-ridden countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, such shows primarily
reflect  the  sensitivities  of  the  Western  viewer,  conjuring  up  a  fictional  dichotomy
between the “Islamic Other” and the “Western Self.” The rhetoric of Islamophobia, Said
concludes, is “more fear and less knowledge about Islam” (Covering Islam 43). In other
words, we are taught to buy into the logic of Islamophobia through a complex power/
knowledge  network  of  social  and  cultural  interactions  that  involve  psychological
processes on the part of audiences as well as elements of manipulation and often clear
distortion on the part of the addressers in the media. A recent documentation project
consequently  defines  Islamophobia  as “a  contrived fear… fomented by  the  existing
Eurocentric and Orientalist global power structure” (“Defining Islamophobia”).7
 
2. Fifty Shades of Green: Fabricated Images of a
Malevolent Islam
7 In  the  following,  I  will  elaborate  on  a  few  textual  examples  that  represent  this
“Orientalist global power structure.” The phenomenon of a “palpable Islamic threat”
that  connects  representations  in  various  media,  such  as  television,  literature,  and
public speech, can be traced back to Cassius Clay’s conversion to Islam in 1964 and the
emergence of the Black Panthers in the late 1960s, with Malcolm X being an especially
Fear of an Islamic Planet? Intermedial Exchange and the Rhetoric of Islamophobia
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
3
striking  figure  of  militant  protest.8 These  diffuse  images  of  a  violent  Islam  have
haunted the American public imaginary ever since. Often, the initial sparks capable of
setting  off  a  myriad  of  fears  regarding  Islam  are  carefully  disguised  in  everyday
practice and encapsulated in visions of “America First” and the ‘values’ of American
Christianity.  Notably,  Trump’s  election  manifesto  Crippled  America  /  Great  Again
(2015/2016) ominously refers to “bad people… coming probably—probably—from the
Middle East” (19-20)—a statement that invokes Trump’s famous allegation, made in a
television interview in May 2016, that “Islam hates us” (qtd. in Schleifer;  cf.  Burke;
Pintak 1-2).
8 In particular, I will demonstrate how interwoven these statements and notions are on
the  level  of  intermedial  exchange.  The  infamous  scenes  of Muslims  allegedly
celebrating the terror attacks of 9/11 in the streets of Palestine are a good case in
point.  First aired on CNN and other news stations a few hours after the attacks on
September 11, 2001, images of sadistically joyful Muslims have since become an eerie
presence in Western culture. The specter of this image is still so powerful in the U.S.
cultural imaginary that it no longer requires any proof or verification. What’s more,
the  image  can  be  freely  transferred  to  connected  scenarios  and  events,  using  the
original motif as a legitimizing point of reference. When asked in November of 2015 at a
campaign rally in Birmingham, Alabama, whether he would support the surveillance of
mosques in the U.S., presidential candidate Donald Trump gave the following answer:
“Hey, I watched when the World Trade Center came tumbling down. And I watched in
Jersey City, New Jersey, where thousands and thousands of people were cheering as
that building was coming down. Thousands of people were cheering. So something’s
going on” (qtd. in Haberman).  Although easily exposed as an empty claim, Trump’s
reference to the “thousands and thousands of people… cheering as the building was
coming  down”  assumes  an  eerie,  three-dimensional  reality  in  the  recipients’
imagination.  We  can  visualize  the  situation  so  easily  because  we  have  seen  it  on
television (no matter what the actual context of these images might have been or how
authentic the footage really was).
9 In a central passage from Mohsin Hamid’s thriller The Reluctant Fundamentalist (2007),
similar  imagery  of  sadistic  schadenfreude  is  intimated.  The  protagonist,  Changez,  a
Pakistani man who has worked in the United States for some time, recollects his own
feelings when watching the events of 9/11 on television. “I stared as one—and then the
other—of the twin towers of  New York’s  World Trade Center collapsed.  And then I
smiled.  Yes,  despicable  as  it  may  sound,  my  initial  reaction  was  to  be  remarkably
pleased” (82-83).  The book’s  implicit  connection between the two scenes,  one from
television, one from the book, is indicative of the overall aesthetics of The Reluctant
Fundamentalist.  The  Cheshire-Cat-like  grin  on  the  character’s  face  in  Hamid’s  novel
seems to reflect the elatedly malevolent grimaces of the dancing Muslims celebrating
9/11 in the aforementioned video. At the same time, audiences are reminded of other
stereotypical images of Muslims they have seen on television and in films. Notably, in
the Disney movie Aladdin (1992), the hero’s homeland is described as utterly barbaric.
Aladdin himself and a couple of allied Arab characters speak fluent American English,
while the other oriental characters are endowed with ridiculously exaggerated accents,
thus being connoted as evil. The original opening song referred to the Middle East as a
place where “they cut off your ear if they don’t like your face” (Ward, “From Aladdin to
Lost Ark”).
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10 For  their  documentary Reel  Bad  Arabs:  How  Hollywood  Vilifies  a  People,  based  on  the
eponymous book by Jack Shaheen, the directors Jeremy Earp and Sut Jhally have sifted
thousands of films and TV shows representing people from the Middle East. According
to the filmmakers, Muslim characters are frequently portrayed as single-minded killing
machines fighting the “American way of life.” Reel Bad Arabs shows that Hollywood is
literally obsessed with what the directors call “the three B’s”: belly dancers, billionaire
sheiks,  and bombers.  I  would like to add a fourth “B” to this list  that functions as a
subtype of the ‘bomber’ stereotype: bearded terrorists—a concept that has resurfaced in
post-9/11 cultural representations of Islam. The archetype of the “Bearded Terrorist”
in the Western cultural imaginary is the America-hating militant extremist—an image
vaguely modeled after infamous terrorist Osama bin Laden who orchestrated the 9/11
attacks.9 The Bearded Terrorist  personifies  the hyperbolic  image of  the Orient  as  a
dangerous place of ubiquitous extremist Islamic violence (and, as such, almost devoid
of elements of lived experience); as an entirely constructed and artificial figure, this
ghost-like creature exemplifies the Orientalist imaginary with its rejection of realistic
representation. “[T]he hyperbole,” Said writes, “is… unique to Orientalism. Life itself—
politics, literature, energy, activity, growth—is an intrusion upon this (to a Westerner)
unimaginable Oriental totality” (Orientalism 279).10 
11 The popular  series  Homeland (2011-2020),  aired  on the  premium television network
Showtime, extensively uses the hyperbole of the Bearded Terrorist. Chided as “the most
Islamophobic show on TV” (Zaheer), Homeland features cliché characters such as the
high-ranking Taliban official Haissam Haqqani, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan War and
fanatic member of Pakistan’s intelligence agency.11 Sporting a beard and assuming the
characteristic demeanor associated with the Taliban, Homeland’s Haissam Haqqani is
marked as the archetypal terrorist character. Notably, the show seems to give “little
importance… to getting basic details about the Islamic world right” (Zaheer).12 Instead,
Homeland encapsulates countless stereotypes connected to Muslims as “a hidden danger
to  Americans”  (Zaheer).13 The  show’s  Islamophobic  agenda  is  furthered  by  the
suggestion that close physical contact with the region of the Middle East suffices to
“infect” a character with the virus of Islamic terrorism. The figure of Marine Sergeant
Nicholas Brody (played by Damian Lewis) is a good case in point. When he returns to
the United States  as  a  celebrated hero after  eight  years  of  captivity  in  Syrian-held
Damascus, Brody is now a terrorist and devoted disciple of al-Qaeda leader Abu Nazir
(played by Iranian-American actor Navid Negahban). Based on a successful Israeli TV
series (Hatufim), Homeland takes its cues from a variety of fictional and non-fictional
sources, among them the popular Fox series 24 (also developed by Homeland’s Howard
Gordon  and  Alex  Gansa)  and  actual  terrorist  organizations  such  as  the  Haqqani
network.14 
12 To what extent the Orientalist imagery is a product of intermedial exchange becomes
evident  when  one  considers  the  world  of  spoofs  and  parodies.  Nowhere  is  the
quintessence of stereotypes better expressed (and perhaps debunked) than in the realm
of caricatures. Probably the best-known example of such hyperbolic representation is
the figure of  “Achmed the Dead Terrorist,”  a  puppet  invented in 2007 by stand-up
comedian and ventriloquist Jeff Dunham.15 Achmed the Dead Terrorist, notably one of
Dunham’s most successful comedic acts, represents the skeleton corpse of a bungling
suicide bomber. Equipped with a comically large turban, bushy eyebrows, and a thick
dark  beard,  Achmed  the  Dead  Terrorist  both  mimics  and  critically  deflects
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Islamophobic  notions  of  the  stereotypical  terrorist.  While  Achmed’s  grotesque
appearance  is  an  effigy  of  visual  stereotypes  concerning  Muslims  (as  presented  in
mainstream newspapers and magazines), his thick accent reveals the character’s roots
in cinematic imagery. One of many YouTube clips of the act was uploaded in January
2015 and received almost 28 million clicks by January 2020 (“Meet Achmed the Dead
Terrorist”). The fact that Dunham’s sketch became a viral internet sensation (and later
a special show for Netflix) shows how deeply interwoven images of Islamic terror are
throughout the media, connecting footage from real-life historic events (such as 9/11),
films and television series as well as books and internet pictures. Through the puppet’s
presence on TV, the Internet, streaming platforms as well as live shows, the persona of
Achmed the Dead Terrorist has become a vivid example of the interconnectedness of
medial forms of representation. With his thick black beard, Achmed provides comic
relief (by ridiculing the monstrous and making it comprehensible). At the same time,
however, the Achmed dummy is a reminder of the uncanny (albeit somehow tamed)
presence of the Bearded-Terrorist specter.
13 The ambiguous Pakistani protagonist Changez in Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist
also sports a beard, as we learn in the book’s opening paragraph. “Excuse me, sir, but
may I be of assistance?” the character asks us—and the American visitor—in the novel’s
first passage. “Do not be frightened by my beard; I am a lover of America” (Hamid 1).
The narrator’s charm offensive is  later exposed as a farce;  Changez has,  in his own
words,  actually  tried  to  “stop  America” (Hamid  191),  although  it  remains  unclear
whether his attempts have materialized in terrorist actions or remained in the vague
realm of verbal and political interaction.16 Not only does the novel conjure up the figure
of the Bearded Terrorist that viewers are familiar with from news television, it also
reactivates similarly uncanny images from the realm of cinema. Changez’s reference to
the horror film Sleepy Hollow (Hamid 194), in which a headless horseman pursues the
inhabitants  of  a  New England small  town,  creates an eerie  connection between the
character’s own religious belief and the violent act of beheading (exploited in grisly
media clips by the terror organization Islamic State).17 “One cannot but join in the
terror  of  poor  Ichabod  Crane,  alone  on  his  horse”  (Hamid  194),  the  protagonist-
narrator beguilingly tells his listener, thus putting the “American”—and the reader of
the novel—in the uncomfortable position of being confronted with a brutal assassin. If
only  to  exceed  the  already  increasing  suspense,  the  passage  then  culminates  in
isolating “that moment when he [Ichabod Crane] first perceives the presence of the
Headless Horseman” (Hamid 194). Here, the novel conjoins the experience of the film
character Ichabod Crane and the literary character of the “American,” showcasing that
both seem to be in a similar situation. This intertextual reference to the world of films
ties in with the novel’s decisively cinematic aesthetic that employs dramatic monologue
and  autodiegetic  narration  in  a  way  highly  reminiscent  of  film  noir’s  voice-over
technique. This intermedial strategy becomes especially effective at the beginning of
chapter 11 when the first-person narrator draws on established images from film noir to
convey the mood on the streets of Lahore where he and the unnamed “American” are
caught in their sinister conversation:
It  is  odd  how  the  character  of  a  public  space  changes  when  it  is  empty;  the
abandoned amusement park, the shuttered opera house, the vacant hotel: in films
these often feature as backdrops for events intended to frighten. So it is with this
market: now that our fellow visitors have dwindled in number to a sporadic and
scattered few, it has taken on a rather more ominous edge. (Hamid 176)
Fear of an Islamic Planet? Intermedial Exchange and the Rhetoric of Islamophobia
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
6
14 Here, the novel invokes the classical setting of a film noir, with its gloomy, menacing
scenario, subtly foreshadowing a possibly fatal outcome of events. These intermedial
references  form  an  aesthetic  pattern  throughout  the  plot  of  The  Reluctant
Fundamentalist, in the course of which the narrator repeatedly employs images from the
realm of cinema to illustrate his viewpoint. When Changez thinks of his first visit to
New York City’s Upper East Side, which immediately feels like home to him, he informs
the reader: “I realized later that I owed my sense of familiarity to the many films that
had  used  it  as  a  setting”  (Hamid  56).  In  another  passage,  the  narrator-protagonist
compares the city of Manila—counter-intuitively to his expectations to find something
similar to Lahore or Karachi—to “a poorer version of the 1950s America depicted in
such films as Grease” (Hamid 73).18
15 The  novel  employs  such  familiar  cinematic  hints  to  visualize  Changez’s  Muslim
perspective through the eyes of the Western reader, while also emphasizing his Middle
Eastern background. Along this narrative strategy,  the novel continuously oscillates
between empathy (letting the reader partly adopt the narrator’s point of view) and
othering (encouraging the reader to despise the narrator’s  inhuman comments).  By
casting  Islamism  “as  both  the  product  of  and  a  rebellion  against  American-led
globalization” (Hartnell, “Moving” 341), the novel opens up a dissenting perspective—
that of the ‘reluctant fundamentalist’ who turns against America after a long history of
disappointment. Yet, at the same time, it employs a narrative pattern deeply embedded
into the mainstream rhetoric of anti-Islamism, invoking the image of the unreliable
and potentially threatening Muslim invader who plots against America. While citing
these very same stereotypes—“that we Pakistanis are all potential terrorists” (Hamid
209)—towards its dramatic finale,  the novel still  leaves readers with precisely these
images and possibilities.
16 Throughout its plot structure, The Reluctant Fundamentalist self-consciously reminds us
of the power of Islamophobic prejudice; nevertheless, it refrains (in contrast to the film
adaptation),  by  way  of  its  open  ending,  from  fully  exposing  these  assumptions  as
myths.  The  book  is  organized  through  the  narrative  framework  of  a  Western
perspective  that  associates  its  Middle  Eastern  protagonist  with  the  formulaic
“terrorist” who revels in the drama of 9/11 and appears in the shapes of stereotypical
characters  such  as  the  Headless  Horseman  and  the  film  noir  gangster.  The  novel’s
Islamic hero Changez, one critic observes, is “made accessible only by being, in fact,
Western” (Chan 829).  What’s  more,  Changez figures,  in  Stephen Chan’s  words,  as  a
“derivative” of the author:
Hamid’s  hero/narrator/sole-spokesman-on-behalf-of-other-characters  is,  like
Hamid,  a  Princeton  graduate,  a  business  and  financial  consultant,  and  from
Pakistan. The entire book, while slowly unveiling the hero’s Islamic revulsion with
things Western, is a litany of how practised, nuanced, polished and at ease are the
hero’s  Western  manners  and  affectations  …  He  has  no discernible  Pakistani  or
Islamic equivalent habits. (829)
17 Changez’s lack of a recognizable Pakistani or Islamic background is perpetuated in the
novel’s composition through a set of intermedial patterns that demarcate the character
as a creature of Western films, newspapers, and other literary texts.19
18 Along these lines, John Updike’s novel Terrorist (2006) also intersects various images
from television,  cinema,  and public  discourse  to  create  a  scenario  in  which radical
Islam has become an imminent threat. The main character is an American-born Muslim
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teenager named Ahmad who lives in the fictional rust-belt town of New Prospect in the
state of New Jersey and is recruited by a workmate to detonate a bomb-laden truck in
the name of Allah. It turns out, as we learn towards the end of the novel, that Ahmad is
actually “a victim… —a fall guy” (Updike 309). Through the focalizing lens of Jack Levy,
a Jewish guidance counselor at Ahmad’s high school, we begin to understand that there
has been a “sting operation” organized by the Department of Homeland Security to
sacrifice Ahmad as a scapegoat. After the scheme has been exposed, Levy conjectures,
the Department does not want “the details out in the media” (Updike 309). The novel’s
reference  to  “the  media”  playing  a  key  role  in  the  staging  of  the  scheme  is  no
coincidence. Life in New Prospect is dominated not only by educational institutions like
the Clifton Public Library (where Jack’s wife works as a librarian), but also by the world
of films. The town changes in a major way when the Hollywood studio system collapses
and “dazzling subversive visions” such as Midnight Cowboy, Easy Rider, and A Clockwork
Orange are released (Updike 25). The choice of these films as reference points already
foreshadows the later plotlines of subversion and juvenile delinquency, situating them
in the context of the Hollywood dream factory.
19 How mediated images constantly shape the lives of American citizens becomes obvious
in a key scene where the conniving Secretary of Homeland Security follows his vision of
“robust  screening”  (Updike  44)  by  intentionally  manipulating  viewers  through
television.  “Destruction,”  the  Secretary  thinks  loudly,  “is  so  much  easier  than
construction, and disruption than social order, that the upholders of a society must
always lag behind those who would destroy it” (Updike 44). Sent out via television from
the  Secretary’s  “cramped  media  facility  sunk  a  hundred  bombproof  feet  beneath
Pennsylvania Avenue” (Updike 44), the Department’s biased messages are based on the
mechanisms of a giant media machinery. The image Updike creates in this scene is that
of  the  media  (and  especially  television)  as  some  massive  subterranean  power,
expanding like a rhizome and connecting all points of social life. Reflected through the
viewpoint of the “terrorist” Ahmad, this media bombardment is bound to trigger rage
and disillusionment in those who feel wronged by the system. “What else do they give
us, the media moguls?” a disenchanted Ahmad asks. Only a few sentences later, the
character  gives  a  sobering  answer  to  this  question:  “The  new  powers…,  the
international corporations, want to wash your brains away, period. They want to turn
you into machines for consuming—the chicken-coop society” (Updike 172). By having
the  character  denounce  “[a]ll  this  entertainment”  (Updike  172-173)  and  “crap”
(Updike 173),  the novel creates the impression that its key theme—that of (Islamic)
terrorism—is thoroughly embedded into a set-up of medial images. The path of medial
discourse, Terrorist suggests, resembles the figural “Yellow Brick Road” from the MGM
movie The Wizard of Oz (1939): behind all the fanciful imagery and colossal façade, there
is  no  actual  meaning  or  truth.  When  looking  at  the  organizing  principle  that
orchestrates this colossal medial war that fabricates concepts such as “terrorism,” we
may come to conclude that there is nothing substantial there. After the red light in the
media room of the Department of Homeland Security goes off and the Secretary, who
has orchestrated the gigantic sham, is “off the air” (Updike 44), the magic seems no
longer active. “He abruptly shrinks in size; now his words will be heard by only the
handful of TV technicians and staffers around him” (Updike 44). The obvious analogy to
the  famous  “exposure”  scene  towards  the  end  of  The  Wizard  of  Oz pinpoints  how
cinematic  and  televisual  images  control  our  understanding  of  what  “terrorism”
actually is. The specter of terrorism, Updike’s book implies, is no more than a visual
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sensation,  designed within a  communication bubble  that  interconnects  politics  (the
Department of Homeland Security) and the media (television) through a network of
power and knowledge.
20 Khaled  Hosseini’s  celebrated  novel  The  Kite Runner (2003)—like  The  Reluctant
Fundamentalist and Terrorist—builds up its images of Islamic terror through cinematic
parameters. The book narrates the story of Amir, a rich Pashtun boy, and his friend
Hassan, who spend their childhood in the still-undisturbed city of Kabul shortly before
the Soviet-Afghan War. The two boys enjoy an innocent life; their favorite pastimes
include kite flying and going to the cinema.20 Throughout its epic story which stretches
over  almost  thirty  years,  The  Kite  Runner emphasizes  the  close  connection between
literature and film. Not only is Amir’s favorite bookstore symbolically located “near
Cinema Park” (Hosseini 21), the novel also accentuates this interconnection on a meta
level,  suggesting an affinity between its own literariness and the experience of film
watching. Thus, The Kite Runner’s key theme—that of kite flying—is intertwined in one
of the many retrospective interior monologues. “Did you still fly kites and go to the
cinema?”  (Hosseini  223)  a  disillusioned  Hassan  wonders  after  not  having  seen  his
childhood friend in years. Stephen Chan has argued that The Kite Runner extensively
cites and even mimics key aesthetic patterns of Hollywood cinema. While the novel’s
first part offers a look at life in Afghanistan through the lens of American film, “[t]he
book’s second part is  all  Hollywood. The blond European childhood acquaintance is
now a blond Taliban commander. The scrawny hero is required to fight the blond Talib
to the death, while the blond Talib’s soldiers wait patiently outside the room where the
duel occurs” (Chan 830).
21 While referring to the genre of American westerns only nominally in its first chapters
(Hosseini 28), The Kite Runner, in its second half, strategically adopts the generic formula
of  the  western,  employing  the  genre’s  classic  ingredients—adventure,  conflict,  and
redemption. “As a cinematic vision,” Stephen Chan maintains, “Hosseini’s book just had
to  become  an  actual  film.  The  kite-running,  with  the  immense  Afghan  sky  as  a
backdrop, could never have been resisted by any producer. But that’s the book’s great
fault  as  well:  it  was  Hollywood  even  before  it  was  acquired  by  Hollywood”  (832).
Following the  novel’s  own internal  logic,  Amir  and Hassan’s  childhood fantasies  of
“cowboys and Indians” (Hosseini 27-28) are symbolically replaced in the second part by
nightmarish encounters between the bloodthirsty Taliban and Afghan natives. The city
of Kabul in the mid-1990s, The Kite Runner suggests, has turned into a real-life Wild West,
where one would constantly run into danger of getting shot by a gunman. “If you went
from the Shar-e-Nau section to Kerteh-Parwan to buy a carpet, you risked getting shot
by a sniper or getting blown up by a rocket—if you got past all the checkpoints, that
was”  (Hosseini  215).  In  these  passages,  the  novel  employs  various  intermedial
references  to  highlight  the  apparent  difference  between  media  coverage  and
experienced reality. A haunting scene, told by Amir’s Afghan taxi driver Farid, recalls
his first encounter with the Taliban: “I’d seen them on TV, on the Internet, on the cover
of magazines and in newspapers. But here I was now, less than fifty feet from them,
telling myself that the sudden taste in my mouth wasn’t unadulterated, naked fear”
(Hosseini 267).
22 Although the novel seems to draw a clear line between fiction and non-fiction, it still
uses emotionally charged images that readers are well familiar with. While ostensibly
emulating an authentic mode of storytelling linked to autobiographic writing, The Kite
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Runner equally immerses itself in the genre of the thriller, emphasizing moments of
fear and suspense that are effectively interconnected in a dramaturgy of quest, conflict,
and final salvation. The various narratives of war and survival are dominated by the
notion  of  “fear  of  the  Taliban”  (Hosseini  237).  After  terror  and  barbarism  have
pervaded the country, Hosseini’s Afghanistan has become a living hell, resembling the
chaos and pandemonium of a horror film. “[T]he Afghanistan of our youth is long dead.
Kindness is gone from the land and you cannot escape the killings … In Kabul, fear is
everywhere, in the streets, in the stadium, in the markets, it is a part of our lives here”
(Hosseini 233). The novel thus presents a scenario of Taliban terror that matches the
expectations of the viewers. The Kite Runner’s plot of friendship and self-discovery is
consequently  organized  around these  nightmarish  visions.  By  endowing  the  events
with signifiers that audiences are already familiar with from Orientalist tales of utter
ruthlessness, the novel imbues its narrative composition with a sense of authenticity
and realness.
 
3. Sleeping Horror: Invasion of the Bearded Terrorists
23 So far, I have argued that the visual composition of three novels by Hamid, Updike, and
Hosseini matches the aesthetic strategy of “reformulating Islam” (Said, Orientalism 282).
By  invoking  a  specter  of  Islam  that  corresponds  with  the  medial  image  of  the
ideologically deluded Muslim, the books say more about the dominant Western cultural
imagination than about the real lives of American Muslims or the lives of Muslims in
other parts of the world. Here, the motif of the “sleeper” is especially significant.21 A
“sleeper,” in this imagery, is a Muslim citizen who has masked his “un-American” and
Islamist mindset to conspire against the country. The figure of Changez in The Reluctant
Fundamentalist is marked as such a “Muslim sleeper.” He lives in America to work for a
corporation named “Underwood Samson” (Hamid 6), a thinly-veiled allusion to “Uncle
Sam,” but concludes that “America had to be stopped in the interests… of the rest of
humanity”  (Hamid 190).  “Changez”—the  name  already  says  it—is  a shapeshifter,
someone who changes his demeanor and perhaps even his personality. At first glance,
he seems to be an ordinary man, but his underlying ferocity could break out any time.
The name “Changez” is  a reference to the Mongolian warrior Genghis Khan, whose
troops invaded large parts of Eurasia in the twelfth century. Thus, Hamid’s character
also  evokes  the  image  of  hostile  takeover.22 This  becomes  obvious  in  another
intertextual  reference  to  Joseph  Conrad’s  classic  Heart  of  Darkness (1899)—and,  by
implication, to Coppola’s Vietnam epic Apocalypse Now (1979). In a crucial scene towards
the finale of the novel, the character of Changez transforms once again, this time into
the evil colonizer Kurtz (from Conrad’s book and Coppola’s movie) who awaits his fate
in the shape of his nemesis Marlow. Since the time he was “warned by my comrades
that America might react to my admittedly intemperate remarks,” Changez tells us (as
protagonist  and narrator),  “I  have felt  rather  like  a  Kurtz  waiting for  his  Marlow”
(Hamid 208). The impression generated in the end of the novel is that of a potential
perpetrator who realizes that he must finally “meet [his] fate when it confronts [him]”
(Hamid 208).23
24 If  Changez is characterized as an ambivalent sleeper, whose actual potential is only
intimated but never fully revealed, Ahmad in Updike’s Terrorist seems to match the
classic  definition  of  the  Muslim  sleeper  who  poses  a  real  and  verifiable  danger  to
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society.  As  foreshadowed  already  in  its  title,  the  novel  sends  out  an  unmistakable
warning to readers that the main character is a presumptive “terrorist.” Unnoticed in
his potential threat to the nation, Ahmad attends the community’s Central High School
(Updike 3).  Ahmad’s teacher is  a  fanatical  imam named Sheik Rashid who bears an
uncanny resemblance to Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda and mastermind of
the 9/11 attacks.  When Ahmad sees  him again at  the end of  the  summer,24 Rashid
“seems unchanged… though in his beard perhaps a few more gray hairs have appeared,
to match his dove-gray eyes” (Updike 232). The beard imagery is significant, since it
points to the character’s duplicity and falsehood. “The imam presented half a face, the
lower half being hidden by a trimmed beard flecked with gray … Within his beard, his
violet lip twitched” (Updike 76, my emphasis). When the imam finally shaves his beard,
Ahmad  emulates  him  again.  The  motive,  however,  is  not  a  rejection  of  Islamic
radicalism, but its  concealment.  “[B]earded Muslims,  even teen-agers,”  a  voice-over
(presumably  that  of  Ahmad’s  religious  leaders)  tells  us,  “alarmed the… customers”
(Updike 275).  As if  to confirm the now-hidden threat,  the ominous voice-over adds: 
“Mohammed Atta had shaved, and most of the other inspired martyrs” (Updike 275).
The real-life Mohamed Atta,25 one of the ringleaders of the 9/11 attacks, here figures as
the prototype of the Muslim sleeper. A seemingly harmless and innocent student who
lived in the United States undetected for almost 15 months, Atta had been recruited by
Osama bin Laden and trained in an al-Qaeda terrorist camp in Afghanistan.
25 Updike’s Ahmad fits into the cliché of the fanatic Muslim sleeper who believes that all
Americans are “[d]evils” that “seek to take away my God” (Updike 3). The novel is literally
framed by the notion of Islamic terror slumbering in the heart of American society.
Thus, the book ends as it begins, with the character Ahmad meditating over “[t]hese
devils [who] have taken away my God” (Updike 310). As Michiko Kakutani observes in The
New York Times, “Ahmad talks not like a teenager who was born and grew up in New
Jersey, but like an Islamic terrorist in a bad action-adventure movie” (“John Updike’s
‘Terrorist’”).26 The  book’s  elliptical  structure  implements  its  vision  of  the  Islamist
sleeper running amok and threatening his environment in a self-fulfilling prophecy
(“these devils seek to take away my God”; Updike 3). “True believers,” Ahmad tells his
friend Charlie, “know that Paradise awaits the righteous” (Updike 174). Updike here
uses the well-known stereotype of the deluded fundamentalist who aspires to murder
‘non-believers’ since he considers himself superior.
26 In the wake of 9/11, when Terrorist and The Reluctant Fundamentalist were published,
audiences  were  faced  with  countless  images  of  “Islamist  sleepers”  in  television
programs such as 24 (Fox, 2001-2010) and Sleeper Cell (Showtime, 2005-2006). In these
shows,  Arab  Americans  were  frequently  portrayed  as  hidden  threats:  next-door
neighbors who simultaneously engaged in sinister terrorist plots (cf. Reel Bad Arabs).
Most recently, the motif of an “immigrant invasion” has been employed in the 2016
presidential campaign, with Donald Trump making his infamous remarks about those
“bad people” coming from Mexico. “The countries south of us are not sending us their
best people … They’re coming from all over Central and South America, and they’re
coming  probably—probably—from  the  Middle  East”  (Great  Again 19-20).  Trump’s
ramblings on the Middle East bring to mind a wide array of established assumptions
regarding Muslims. Notably, Trump cites neither statistics nor hard facts to prove his
claim  but  “headlines  and  videos  [that]  tell  us  what  we’re  dealing  with:  rapes,
kidnapping, and lining up civilians in order to cut their heads off” (Great Again 37).
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Trump here taps into a number of  clichés about radical  Muslims from literary and
cultural practice.
27 Along these lines of Orientalist imagery, Assef, one of the key characters in Hosseini’s
The  Kite  Runner is  marked  as  a  madman,  partly  German,  partly  Afghan,  and  “[a]
sociopath”  (Hosseini  34)  who  rapes  boys  and  later  joins  the  Islamist  Taliban  in
Afghanistan.27 In a key scene of the novel, the outcry “Beard Patrol” (Hosseini 267) is
immediately connected with the horrors of Islamic terror inflicted upon the country by
the religious zealots. The Kite Runner barely defuses this dynamic of fear and constant
threat in its aesthetic construction. To the contrary, the novel efficiently plays with
these stylistic devices of a “dread of Islam” to increase the power of its narrative.
28 Images of a militant Islam teeming with Bearded Terrorists and other Orientalist cliché
figures connect to the contemporary climate in the United States with its fear of the
“Muslim  Other.”  The  current  political  situation  is  based  on  a  long  tradition  of
Orientalist thinking that shapes a notion of the national self through disguised hints at
the Other. It operates through a rhetoric of adaptation linked to what Said calls “the
now  traditional  Orientalist  ability  to  reconstruct  and  reformulate  the  Orient”
(Orientalism 282).  By  transforming  Islam—or  at  least  aspects  of  it—into  a  virtual
nightmare, texts across the gamut of the medial scale (from books to films and internet
posts) create a specter of terror against which dominant culture must position itself.
While pointing to the danger posed by Muslims abroad, this rhetoric equally aims at
Muslim citizens already living in America, possibly harbingers of an Islamist invasion. 
The  so-called  “birther”  movement  that questioned  whether  Barack  Obama  was  a
natural-born  U.S.  citizen  is  a  prime  example  of  this  paranoid  imagination. Donald
Trump, who functioned as an unofficial spokesman of the movement, repeatedly raised
questions regarding Obama’s  national  origins and,  by implication,  his  religion.  This
included allegations that Obama was, in fact, a Muslim who preferred the Quran to the
Bible—a claim visualized in thousands of memes on the Internet (“Did President Obama
Use the Quran to Take His Oath of Office?”). As ridiculous as it may seem at first glance,
these images have assumed the status of a plausible truth to many viewers over the
years.  It  is  through  the  intermedial  mingling  of  half-truths  spread  on  mainstream
television  (for  instance,  information  based  on  biographical  notes  such  as  Obama’s
childhood in Indonesia and his father’s professional background in Kenya) with purely
invented narratives  (e.g.,  conspiracy theories  dispersed in YouTube clips  and social
media) that the “fear of an Islamic planet” is charged with its affective efficiency.
 
4. Conclusion
29 To conclude, I have argued that a vast number of texts in contemporary U.S. public
discourse address notions of Muslims as “alien” to mainstream American values. These
“texts” can be films,  newspaper reports,  books,  internet blogs,  or stand-up comedy
shows.  They  do  not  endorse  Islamophobic  sentiment  or  intentionally  support  such
notions or feelings. However, through the power of intermedial exchange, elements of
Islamophobia  are  often  conveyed  and  disseminated  subliminally,  within  the  banal
context of everyday social practice that accompanies the cultural production of texts.
What I have tried to showcase is that “accents of alarm and fear” (Said, Covering Islam
xxxv) inform—and often dominate—these cultural  negotiations.  Hamid’s thriller The
Reluctant Fundamentalist, for example, invokes an atmosphere of deep distrust between
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the  two  main  characters,  a  Pakistani  professor  and  an  American  visitor.  While
challenging us on some assumptions regarding Islam, the novel also plays with visceral
images of threat and incompatibility between Muslims and Christians. In a similar vein,
Updike’s Terrorist employs the signifier of the “Muslim sleeper” to talk about fears of
uncontrollable  Islamic  terror,  fueled  by  already  existing  discourses  in U.S.  cultural
practice. Hosseini’s The Kite Runner makes use of a cinematic aesthetics to let readers
live  through  the  horrors  of  Taliban  terror  in  Afghanistan—a  fear  that  mirrors  the
Western viewpoint of fear and disgust.
30 In all three novels, the specter of a militant, anti-Western Islam is negotiated, in which
the Muslim characters pose a vital threat to American values (albeit with interspersed
components of ambiguity, redemption, and at least partial reconciliation). It is through
intermedial  exchange,  that is,  the interaction of  film, literature,  television,  and the
Internet, that readers are effectively prepared for such stereotypes. Islam emerges here
as a religion at war—with America, in particular, and with life and progress, in general.
The continuous reference to images already established by the media is part of what
Rajewsky calls the “illusion-forming quality” (54) of intermedial processes.  Through
this  act  of  illusion-making,  analogies  are  drawn  between  the  “principles,  rules  of
communication,  and strategies”  (55)  of  one particular  text,  such as,  for  example,  a 
speech by Donald Trump, and those employed by texts from another medium, say, an
internet blog, a Fox newscast, or an adventure movie.
31 By  means  of  this  interaction  between  the  media,  fears  of  Islam  are  fomented  and
transformed into a subjective reality to be adopted and appropriated by the recipient.
It is worth mentioning that these operational mechanisms between the media would be
impossible  without  a  social  practice  that  enables  the  discourse  of  Islamophobia  to
continue. Through social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), key elements of the discourse
are isolated and magnified, enhancing an already-pervasive visual practice (television,
cinema,  etc.).  This  cultural  fantasy  of  Islam  becomes  active  through  elements  of
intermedial exchange, burning itself into the dominant imagination and growing into a
monster,  an  existential  threat  that  is  none.  Thus  conceived,  the  fear  of  an  Islamic
planet is no more than a fiction turned into a perceived fact through the power of the
media.
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NOTES
1. Other examples, in which Trump referred to “Radical Islamic Terrorism,” include an interview
on the French presidential elections in April 2017, and a July 2017 address in Poland. He also used
the phrase “Islamic terrorism” in his 2015 campaign book Crippled America (that was retitled into
Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America after Trump had won the elections) (Great Again 13).
2. Pintak acknowledges the broad cultural and political background that enabled the emergence
of this type of fear: “Trump’s words reflected a simplistic and distorted worldview, but the fault
did not lie with him alone. Donald Trump was the almost-inevitable product of a long history of
misguided politics and misleading assumptions about Islam” (1).
Fear of an Islamic Planet? Intermedial Exchange and the Rhetoric of Islamophobia
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
16
3. “Muslims,” Pintak writes in his study America & Islam,  “were the first enemies of the new
republic  …  In  the  years  after  independence,  the  Barbary  pirates  were  ravaging  American
shipping along the North African coast, prompting Thomas Jefferson to order a navy be built to
mount what would be the first of many U.S. military interventions in the Middle East” (6).
4. In  my usage,  the  term “exchange” refers  to  the  interaction and interconnection between
distinct  levels  of  cultural  practice,  in  this  case,  literature,  television,  and  cinema.  Thus,  my
reading  is  informed  by  a  New  Historicist  and  poststructuralist  understanding  of  cultural
processes of dialogue across the media and across various text types. Similar to the concept of
“circulation,” the idea of cultural exchange owes a lot to Stephen Greenblatt’s theory of “restless
oscillation” (Greenblatt  8)  between history and textuality,  in the process  of  which “practical
strategies of negotiation” come into effect. 
5. In all quotes, the italics are in the original. In the event that italics have been added, it will be
noted.
6. Since Islamophobia operates as “a fear or dislike of Islam that by consequence extends to all
Muslims without differentiation” (Allen, “Islamophobia” 376), it exploits, by definition, a set of
cultural  stereotypes  which  are  emboldened  by  the  media  and  other  “communities  of
interpretation,” as Edward Said puts it (Covering Islam 36-68).
7. Chris Allen, a sociologist at University of Leicester’s Centre of Hate Studies, has examined the
phenomenon of  Islamophobia in a  number of  groundbreaking publications—e.g.,  Islamophobia
(2010) and Reconfiguring Islamophobia (2020). Allen places special emphasis on the global impact
that Islamophobic attitudes disseminated in the Western media have on the lives of Muslims in
different countries. Citing a much-publicized UN report, he notes: “[G]iven the marked increase
in Islamophobia since the turn of the century, if immediate action was not taken, Islamophobia
would pervade the lived experience of an ever-growing number of Muslims around the world”
(Allen,  Reconfiguring  Islamophobia 1).  Other  scholars  have  cautioned  to  take  into  account  the
nuances that may come into play in social practices of Islamophobia. In Islamophobia Islamophilia, 
Andrew  Shyrock  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  to  many  recipients  there  is  a  perceived
“rationale” behind their fear of Islam, rooted in the alarming numbers of medially represented
threats linked to persons of Muslim faith (9).
8. Karen Armstrong argues that “we have a long history of Islamophobia in Western culture that
dates back to the time of the Crusades” (17). In recent decades, representations of Islam as a
radical  political  movement  (symbolized  by  Malcolm  X’s  and  Cassius  Clay’s  much-publicized
conversions to the Muslim faith) contributed to a resurgence of Islamophobic sentiment. This
development has been exacerbated since the 1980s and especially in the aftermath of 9/11, when
Islam became widely associated in popular culture with a “violent creed” (see Kabir 11-30, 15). 
9. Films employing the stereotype of the “reel bad Arab” include Steven Spielberg’s Raiders of the
Lost Ark (1981), David Cameron’s True Lies (1994) and Edward Zwick’s The Siege (1998). In a famous
scene from Lost Ark, Indiana Jones, on one of his journeys into the “Orient,” is faced with a sable-
rattling Muslim whom he abruptly shoots in the head. Similarly ridiculous figures can be found
in Cameron’s True Lies, in which a group of “Arab terrorists” is paraded as caricatures of Western
projections of the Middle East. Zwick’s The Siege cuts between scenes of praying Muslims and
images of exploding bombs, conjuring up the specter of “Muslim terror” (cf. Landes).
10. Through the act of hyperbolic exaggeration, the “tension between ‘Islam’ as a transcendent,
compelling Oriental fact and the realities of everyday human experience” (Said, Orientalism 278)
is at once highlighted and playfully erased. As a device in fiction (especially when deploying
realistic modes of storytelling), the hyperbole may no longer be recognized as a rhetorical figure,
but serves to replace lived social practice by a mere specter that is now perceived as a gruesome
reality (just as the image of a bearded Osama bin Laden has come to function as a distorted proxy
of Muslim experience).
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11. The character of Haissam Haqqani, who is played by Turkish-born German actor Numan Acar,
appears in season four of Homeland in 2014; the role is reprised in Homeland’s eighth and final
season.
12. In his pungent critique of Homeland, Mohammad Zaheer reveals a number of discrepancies
and factual mistakes. “Arab characters have been given Persian names,” and Pakistan’s capital
Islamabad is one-sidedly depicted as a “grimy hellhole and war zone” (Zaheer).
13. The character of Abu Nazir in Homeland’s seasons 1 and 2 stands out as the epitome of Islamic
fanaticism. Functioning as “the show’s central nemesis” (“Hollywood’s Terrorist”), Abu Nazir is
marked as an utterly destructive and vicious figure, being an al-Qaeda “terrorist mastermind”
(“Hollywood’s Terrorist”) driven by impulses of vengeance against the United States that had
organized a drone attack killing his son.
14. The figure of Haissam Haqqani is designed as a reference to the real-life Haqqani network, an
Afghan guerilla group that deployed asymmetric warfare against U.S.-led NATO forces and the
government in Afghanistan. The group pledged allegiance to the Taliban in the mid-1990s and
later became affiliated with the emergent terror network of al-Qaeda (see Rassler and Brown).
15. According to a Forbes list from July of 2009, Jeff Dunham was the third highest-paid comedian
in the United States in that year after Jerry Seinfeld and Chris Brown (see Rose). Dunham’s show
Spark of Insanity, first taped at the Warner Theater in Washington, D.C. in 2007, became an instant
sensation, taking the artist onto a two-year tour through the USA and Europe with 386 venues
worldwide.
16. In this  closing section of  the novel,  Hamid uses the device of  the unreliable narrator to
reinforce a sense of suspense and keep his readers in limbo regarding Changez’s true identity.
“What exactly did I do to stop America, you ask?” the narrator mockingly asks the American
(and, by implication, the reader), “Have you really no idea, sir?” (Hamid 191). When the novel
returns to this question ten pages later, we are still not given a satisfactory answer. Changez’s
admission  that  all  he  can  do  is  to  “attempt  an  answer,  even  though it  may  well  leave  you
disappointed”  (Hamid 210)  is  vested  in  images  that  corroborate  the  impression  of  obscurity
surrounding the character. Not only does he begin his explanation with the ambiguous phrase
“as we come to the end of our time together” (Hamid 210), the ensuing account of his protest
against America revels more in intimations than factual descriptions, suggesting, for example,
that  he  “was  perhaps  more  forceful  on  this  topic  than  I  intended”  (Hamid  207).  Notably,
Changez’s  tale  is  interconnected  in  these  passages  with  references  to  images  produced  by
“international television news networks” (Hamid 207), which underlines the novel’s aesthetics of
intermedial exchange.
17. Although the Islamic State started its public beheadings about seven years after the first
publication of  Hamid’s  novel,  there  is  still  a  strong aesthetic  connection between these  two
cultural “texts.” A reader of The Reluctant Fundamentalist in 2014 or 2015 would easily connect the
novel’s references to the motif of beheading with the gory executions filmed and screened by IS
which went  viral  during  these  years.  This  subliminal  interconnection  underscores  the  sheer
power of intermedial exchange, with images from literary texts eerily corresponding to images
disseminated through websites and social media forums. Hamid’s cross-reference to Washington
Irving’s  gothic  short  story  “The  Legend  of  Sleepy  Hollow”  (the  title  incorrectly  used  as  a
reference point to Tim Burton’s film) underlines the importance of intermedial allusions within
the novel’s aesthetic structure.
18. The novel consistently accentuates this interconnection between literature and the media
industry. In one passage, the narrator Changez reminisces how he travels with his friend Jim to
Santiago de Chile where he meets the chief editor of a publishing company. When asked “What
do you know about books?” Jim replies: “I specialize in the media industry” (Hamid 160). It is
only then that the narrator decides to reveal his family’s connections to literary art (“My father’s
uncle was a poet … Books are loved in my family” 161). Referring to the novel’s fascination with
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acts of storytelling and writing (Changez’s girlfriend is a writer as well), Mohamed Salah Eddine
Madiou has interpreted The Reluctant Fundamentalist as a work of metafiction whose aesthetics is
based on intertextual and self-referential strategies of composition (271ff).
19. “The hero is Islamic,” Chan concludes, “but there is nothing Islamic about him except some
brief rhetoric related to the 9/11 attacks on the New York where he used to live” (830).
20. The characters’ affinity with U.S. American cinema is highlighted early in the novel. While
growing up in the heart of predominantly Islamic Afghanistan, Amir and Hassan become fond of
American  westerns.  “We saw our  first  Western  together,  Rio  Bravo with  John Wayne,  at  the
Cinema Park, across the street from my favorite bookstore” (Hosseini 28). By accentuating the
aesthetic  proximity  between  film  and  literature,  the  novel  augments  the  impression  of  an
exchange between the media, both on the narrative and on the aesthetic level (cf. Hosseini 88,
229).
21. The “sleeper” is a crucial motif in the invasion rhetoric of cinema and literature, going back
to the genre of science fiction films of the 1950s. In movies such as Don Siegel’s Invasion of the
Body Snatchers, seemingly innocent U.S. citizens turn out to be messengers of an alien nation that
attempts to infiltrate and colonize America. Born out of the paranoid climate of McCarthy’s “red
scare” America, the gist of these films is revived in productions from the 1970s and 80s, such as
Ridley Scott’s Alien, in which evil forces literally “snatch” the bodies of Americans to breed into
U.S. society and extinguish the basis of U.S. culture.
22. Notably, the movie version, directed by Indian filmmaker Mira Nair, resolves some of the
ambiguities contained in the novel. While the book plays with the notion of an actual danger
emanating  from  Changez,  the  film  exposes  its  protagonist  as  a  victim  of  totalitarian  power
structures that privilege a dominant western “truth” over the subjugated realities of Muslim
lives.
23. What turns this ending into a kind of twist is the fact that the narrator (Changez) finally
transforms into the narratee (Kurtz) who meets the actual narrator (Marlow). In contrast to the
movie  version,  which  directs  the  viewer  into  a  position  of  identification  with  Changez-the-
victim, the book leaves space for an interpretation in which the threat of Changez is not just
imagined, but real.
24. The time frame indicated in this passage is a reference to the 9/11 attacks which also took
place at the end of the summer (on September 11, 2001).
25. I am using the spelling “Mohamed Atta” here to refer to the real-life Egyptian hijacker and
co-architect  of  the 9/11 attacks,  in which four commercial  airplanes were commandeered to
destroy various civilian and military targets in the United States; in the novel Terrorist, however,
he is spelled “Mohammed Atta” (Updike 275).
26. Anna Hartnell takes a slightly more favorable stance towards Updike’s book. While criticizing
the author for his “inability to fully acknowledge the communal aspects of Islam” (“Violence”
497), she also lauds Terrorist as an “important intervention that occasions a reflection on the
relationship between religion and violence” (“Violence” 478). “Updike’s decision to tackle the
perspective of the ‘perpetrator’ is a courageous attempt to pull away from the prevalent cultural
tendency to privilege the category of ‘trauma’ in treatments of 9/11” (“Violence” 478).
27. The sepia-colored cover of the first edition of Hosseini’s novel, published with Bloomsbury in
2003, anticipates this theme of invasion. The image shows the rear image of a little boy in shorts
and a t-shirt—presumably the author’s fictional alter ego in the narrative universe of the novel—
who approaches the entrance of a house to peek into the building’s interior, suggesting a sense of
vulnerability and defenselessness. By portraying the boy from behind, the book creates an aura
of exposure and imminent danger, to be revealed as radical Islamic fundamentalism.
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ABSTRACTS
The post-9/11 era is marked by an unusual rise of Islamophobic rhetoric that permeates the U.S.
cultural imaginary and connects a wide range of medial discourses from literature and cinema to
television  and  the  World  Wide  Web.  Orientalist  stereotypes  have  informed  Hollywood
blockbusters and television series as well as acclaimed novels such as Khaled Hosseini’s The Kite
Runner (2003), John Updike’s Terrorist (2006), and Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist
(2007), not to mention Donald Trump’s speeches and writings on “radical Islamic terrorism.” My
essay argues that contemporary public discourse in the U.S. addresses an array of viral images,
portraying  Muslims  as  essentially  “alien”  to  mainstream  American  values.  The  fears  of  a
potential—or  already  ongoing—“Islamization  of  America”  are  kept  alive  through  continual
interaction between texts and images from hegemonic visual discourse,  involving what I  call
“intermedial exchange” between literary texts, films, television shows, magazines, newspapers,
and the Internet.
INDEX
Keywords: Intermedial Exchange, Islamophobia, The Reluctant Fundamentalist (Hamid),
Terrorist (Updike), The Kite Runner (Hosseini), (Islamic) Terrorism, Donald Trump
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